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east Asia in which it controls key segments of their foreign policies. In pursuit of a new world order, the United States has in recent decades attempted to ex? pand its authority over other states into Eastern Europe, which has been met with a measure of success, and the Middle East, which has been far more prob? lematic largely because its attempted rule there is not seen as legitimate.1
Diplomats acknowledge the authority of the United States through deeds, but engage in a conspiracy of silence. Newly empowered leaders in the devel? oping world champion the principles of sovereignty and national self-determi? nation to secure their rule.2 To speak publicly of the authority of the United States would gravely weaken their hold on power. Even in established democ? racies, leaders are loath to challenge the myth of unbridled popular sover? eignty or to admit to themselves and their citizens that they are, in part, under the authority of the United States. US leaders have understood that to claim authority over others would force their counterparts in subordinate states to deny this fact and thus undermine the legitimacy of US rule. As a result, US authority has been cloaked in the euphemisms. Analysts talk of hegemony, soft power, and recently the declining legitimacy of US power.3 Diplomats de?
scribe the United States as the leader of the free world that maintains special relationships with strategic partners. Only critics of the United States give voice to its authority in describing it as a neoimperialist or neocolonial power, concepts that are rejected by the mainstream precisely because they threaten to reveal the authority that dares not speak its name. 4 The authority wielded by the United States over its subordinates, despite occasional abuses, has been enormously beneficial. Much like individuals in Thomas Hobbes' state of nature who give up personal autonomy for the ben? efits of a civil society, subordinate states give up a measure of sovereignty for a political order created and enforced by the United States.5 This order pro?
vides security both internally and externally and permits unprecedented pros? perity. The United States, in turn, gains from writing the rules of that order and, especially, from turning possible rivals into reliable subordinates that largely comply with its rules. 6 The so-called Western international order has actually rested on US authority and its accompanying social contracts. It has also produced very real benefits. The key foreign policy task before the United
States today is not to diminish its authority, but to safeguard that authority and preserve its benefits into the future.
Unipolarity and the excesses of the George W. Bush administration that it permitted have finally brought the authority of the United States into public discourse?and into question. The "American empire" discussed in the main? stream media for the first time since at least the Vietnam War is an exaggera?
tion, but the new use of the term reveals the increasingly problematic status of US rule.7 The Barack Obama administration is moving quickly to reverse the assertive unilateralism of its predecessor, a change in strategy that, it appears, played a major role in winning the new and untested president the Nobel Peace Prize.8 This new strategy will help reinforce the crumbling foundations of US authority. Yet the problem is deeper, more structural, and cannot be solved simply by a change of diplomatic tone or adopting more collaborative policies. To secure the international order that has been so beneficial in the past cen? tury and to succeed in extending that order to countries that do not yet enjoy its fruits require a new, more restraining, multilateral solution that binds the hands of the United States far more tightly than in the past. To rule legitimately requires tying the suzerain's hands.
Power, Authority, and International Politics There are two primary forms of power in international politics. Through coer? cion, one state gets a second state to do something it would otherwise not do by threatening some costly action and, in the event of noncompliance, actually im? posing the threatened costs on the recalcitrant state.9 Like a mugger who exerts coercion by demanding "your money or your life," the United States imposed sanctions on Iraq during the 1990s, and Israel today controls trade in and out of Gaza in an attempt to influence the behavior of the Hamas government.
Through authority, one state gets another to do something it would other?
wise not do because its command is regarded as legitimate. More specifically, in an authority relationship, subordinates recognize that a dominant state has the right to issue certain limited commands, that they have a duty or obligation to comply if possible, and that the dominant state has a right to enforce its commands if they choose to violate them.10 The right of enforcement entails the use of force or violence often associated with coercion, but the context is quite different; unlike in coercion where force is threatened to extract some concession, in authority force is used to gain compliance with a rule that is it? self recognized as legitimate.11 Even as we might bemoan the tax and seek loopholes to evade the burden, we accept as authoritative the government's right to a share of our income and its right to punish us if we cheat.
Despite the widespread assumption that the international system is anar? In a dependency, an extremely hierarchical economic relationship, the dominant state can exercise broad authority over the subordinate's commercial, monetary, and even fiscal policies, as frequently happens in countries that "dollarize" their economies (e.g., Panama and Ecuador). Again, there are many intermediate gradations. 16 For the reasons discussed above, the terms for some of these relationships may sound archaic, even politically incorrect. But as the examples suggest, they are still relevant in describing real relationships in the contemporary world.
In the modern era, the right of one country to rule in whole or part over another derives not from tradition, divine right, or any normative consensus, but from an exchange or social contract. 17 The dominant state produces a po? litical order that protects persons, property, and promises. It secures individu? als in a subordinate state from bodily harm at the hands of both fellow citizens and other countries, defends their property from challenges that are constant or without limit at home or abroad, and ensures that promises, once made, will be kept. In return, the subordinates comply with the rules and the extractions necessary to produce that order and accept as legitimate the position of the dominant state. The dominant state gains from writing and enforcing rules that are biased in its favor, subject to the willingness of subordinates to comply with those rules. Subordinates gain from the security provided by the political order and the attendant opportunity to invest, specialize, and prosper. Subor?
dinates escape a Hobbesian state of nature in which life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" and enter an international civil society. In contem? porary practice, this means that the United States produces political order within and between subordinate states in return for their compliance with its rules and recognition of its special position in international relations.
The authority exercised by the United States produces a syndrome of unique foreign policy behaviors.18 Protected in part from external threats, states subordinate to the United States spend substantially less on defense as a share of their gross domestic product (GDP) than nonsubordinate states. Hav? ing committed to their defense, in return, the United States is significantly more likely to come to the aid of its subordinates in international crises. Pro? tected under its security umbrella and following rules set down by the United States for the international economy, subordinate states are more open to trade and especially more likely to trade with countries that are also subordinate to the United States. In implicit acknowledgment of their status, subordinate states join US-led multinational coalitions more often than nonsubordinates, calling into question the notion of a "coalition of the willing." Finally, exer? cising its right of enforcement, the United States is more likely to intervene militarily in subordinate states. All of these patterns are hard to explain if re?
lations between states in fact are anarchic and, more important, are consistent with the existence of a social contract. States has sought to extend its authority far beyond its previous limits.
This effort was certain to be controversial. Authority is always negotiated, and problematic at its margins. Early in any new authority relationship, each state will be especially sensitive to issues of precedent and credibility, and dis? agreements are likely to be frequent. In the decades before the Good Neighbor Policy, which signaled less a change in attitude than the success of the United States in establishing its authority, Washington intervened militarily over twenty times in Latin America. 26 The new authority relationships with states in Eastern Europe or the Persian Gulf were likely to be similarly fraught with disagreements and conflict as the contours of US authority were negotiated. A period of tension and new uses of force should have been expected.
Equally, in attempting to expand its authority over states in the Persian Gulf, the United States sided with traditional monarchial and secular regimes, much as it supported brutal dictatorships in Latin America in earlier decades.27
These besieged governments were especially interested in developing rela? tionships with the United States, and willing to cede some measure of their sovereignty, precisely because they were weak and under increasing threat at home. These budding international hierarchies brought the United States into direct opposition with the religious fundamentalists who are the primary chal? lengers to these regimes. Incensed at the stationing of US troops on the land of the Prophet, and understanding that Washington would now prop up and bolster regimes they opposed, the Islamists declared war on the United States as well. As the trajectory of Al-Qaida demonstrates, attention gradually shifted from the "near enemy" of apostate regimes in the Gulf to the "far enemy" that now governed in part their fate. With the growth of US authority, Islamists cor? rectly infer that the road to Riyadh now leads through Washington and New York.28 The answer to the question of "why do they hate us?" lies in the au? thority that is exercised by the United States over its new subordinates.
Untying the Suzerain's Hands
The handmaiden of authority is restraint by the ruler. Within the United States, the Constitution divides power and creates checks and balances such that each branch of government will restrain the others. International authority is no dif? ferent. Checks and balances are necessary to constrain the authority of the dominant state.29 A state's decision to subordinate itself to another is one of the most pro? found choices it can make. Not only does it thereby agree to follow the rules of the dominant state, but it opens itself to the possibility of costly punish? ments if it does not comply with those commands. Equally, once vested, a dominant state can use its authority to encroach further on the rights of its sub?
ordinates over time. To enter and remain in such a relationship requires confi?
dence by subordinates that the authority they grant to dominant states will not be used to violate the social contract by making illegitimate demands or ex? panding authority further in the future. In domestic politics, this is known as the problem of tying the sovereign's hands. 30 In international politics, the problem is how to tie the suzerain's hands.
Throughout the Cold War, the authority of the United States was re? strained naturally by the competition with the Soviet Union, which created an alternate pole around which disaffected subordinates, like Cuba, or states that feared US opportunism could rally. The United States was also restrained by its own democratic institutions, which revealed its intentions to other states and made deviations from current policy more difficult. Together, these natu? ral constraints had the paradoxical effect of making US domination far more attractive than it otherwise would have been. So constrained, the United States enjoyed what Gier Lundestad once called an "empire by invitation." 31 These natural restraints were reinforced by a self-imposed strategy of multilateralism, the hallmark of US foreign policy since 1945.32 Multilateral?
ism gives other states a voice over US policy. It also creates a set of "fire alarms" that can be pulled should the United States transgress the limits to its authority. By its need to hold coalitions together, the United States constrains its ability to abuse those same subordinates. Finally, by its willingness to give other countries a voice and an ability to monitor and sanction its policies, the United States signals its willingness to operate within the bounds of interna? tional consensus on its rightful role as leader. 33 In the absence of great-power competition, a dominant state is restrained only by its internal checks and balances and its willingness to restrain itself through multilateralism. This self-restraint depends on virtue, a recognition of limits, and a concern for sustaining its authority over the long term. Yet virtue is a weak fetter. As James Madison, architect of the division of powers in the US Constitution wrote, "the truth is that all men having power ought to be mis? trusted."34 President George W. Bush and his advisers were seduced by the condi? tion of unipolarity and the unprecedented coercive power of the United States. 35 Frightened by the first significant attack on the United States in fifty years, Americans demanded that the administration "do something." Re?
sponding to this pressure, Congress and even the courts failed to exert their normal checks on the executive branch. Fearing that they would be held re? sponsible for any future attacks, the administration eschewed multilateralism and insisted on unrestricted unilateral action in pursuit of the nation's inter? ests. Believing that other states would fall into line once they observed the overwhelming coercive power of the United States, the administration as?
serted new rights of intervention and regime change in the Persian Gulf that went far beyond what others were prepared to accept.36 In essence, the Bush administration followed its predecessors in seeking to extend US authority to new regions of the globe, but broke with the practice of embedding that au? thority in multilateral institutions.
By untying the nation's hands in an attempt to smash and intimidate for? 
How to Bind a Giant
How then can US authority be made safe for the world? Once broken, can a country retie its own fetters? To the extent that the international authority of the United States is important for the maintenance and possible expansion of international order, to simply allow its authority to wither would have serious consequences not only for the United States, but for other states as well. But now that its hands are free, it is hard to mask its power simply by slipping the old ropes back on. Knowing that coercion can still be used, other countries will be far less likely to grant the United States authority over their affairs. With less authority, the United States will be more tempted to resort to coercion to achieve its ends. The authority of the United States, and the political orders it supports, threaten to unravel in a vicious circle.
President Obama and his administration appear to recognize the need to bolster the authority and legitimacy of the United States in the world. But virtue alone cannot provide credible guarantees against future US oppor? tunism. Unipolarity is an enabling condition that persists. The problem of credibility is structural, and not one that a new administration can solve sim?
ply by a new style or approach to foreign policy. Ironically, to safeguard its au? thority requires that the United States embed its coercive capabilities even deeper into multilateral institutions that can provide real checks on potential opportunism.
Whether and how the United States should bind itself internationally is an old and recurring debate. The struggle over the League of Nations is often mis construed.38 President Woodrow Wilson envisioned the League precisely as a vehicle that would allow the United States to create order and earn authority over other states, and accepted that multilateral constraints on Washington were a price worth paying. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, his principal antago? nist, was not an isolationist as is sometimes averred. He instead was a unilat? eralist who supported the effort to extend international order, but opposed the League because it would unduly constrain rights possessed by the United States "which ought not to be infringed."39 Similarly, Presidents Franklin De? lano Roosevelt and Harry Truman sought to extend and secure US authority in the postwar period by embedding it in multilateral institutions, including the Bretton Woods organizations, the United Nations, and later NATO.40 Oppo? nents, led by Senator Robert Taft, again supported a new, more active role for the United States in international affairs, but opposed multilateralism because it threatened to put US foreign policy "at the mercy" of other states.41 While losing the first of these debates, the multilateralists decisively made the case after 1945 for extending the authority of the United States and embedding it in multilateral institutions, ushering in a half-century of constancy in US policy.
In Western Europe, NATO succeeded as both a vehicle for and a check on US authority because the members were deeply interdependent not only eco? nomically, but also militarily. Although not formed in any single vision, NATO was, in retrospect, a brilliantly designed institution 42 The United States pro? vided the vast bulk of the organization's military capabilities. Even as it de?
cried the free riding of its allies, this critical role allowed the United States to set the policy agenda of NATO and, through that power, the policy agendas of member nations.43 Dependent on the United States for their defense, in turn, West Europeans ceded control over many dimensions of their foreign and de? fense policies to Washington. At an extreme, with its military forces locked up in NATO, West Germany lost its ability to conduct an independent foreign pol? icy, especially its ability to use or even threaten to use its military capabilities against its neighbors?a right of otherwise sovereign states.
Nonetheless, the United States was constrained within NATO by its de? pendence on the Europeans. The United States never had enough troops or ma? teriel in place to deter an attack on the continent or to defend it single-handedly. Contributions from the Europeans themselves were essential to the credibility of conventional deterrence. The United States was also de? pendent on forward bases on the continent. Even as the United States clearly led the alliance, any significant use of force within Europe required the coop? eration and, thus, the consent of the Europeans. 44 The United States could, of course, always choose to act outside the alliance, but at a substantially greater cost to itself. In effect, these mutual dependencies rendered the authority of the United States not only acceptable, but desirable for Europe.
The ad hoc multilateralism of the 1990s had many similarities to NATO, but was ultimately less beneficial and restraining. From the invasion of 
Retying the Knots
The safeguarding of US authority requires multilateralism that is broader and certainly deeper than in the 1990s?more like NATO than the ad hoc coali?
tions of the new world order. Indeed, absent the constraints exerted by com? petition with the Soviet Union, the institutional fetters through which the United States must bind its own hands will have to be even stronger than those in NATO.47 The great paradox of contemporary international politics is that the unprecedented international power of the United States requires even more binding constraints on its policy if it is to preserve the authority that it has built over the last half-century and extend it to new areas of the globe. The advanced military capabilities of the United States will make it a key actor in any such multilateral institution and will allow it to set the collective agenda. Since it is highly unlikely that anything will happen in the absence of US involvement, as in Bosnia where the Europeans dithered until the United States stepped to the fore,48 Americans need not be overly concerned about "runaway" organizations or global mission creep. At the same time, if any or? ganization is to be an effective restraint on the United States, other countries will have to make serious and integral contributions to the collective effort. Both sides to this new multilateral bargain will need to recognize and appreci ate the benefits of a stable international order to their own security and pros? perity and contribute to its success. The United States will need to continue to play a disproportionate role in providing international order, even as it accepts new restraints on its freedom of action. Other countries, however, must also contribute to the provision of this political order so that they can provide a meaningful check on US authority.
Americans are likely to resist the idea of tying their hands more tightly in a new multilateral compact. After six decades, US leadership and its fruits?
security, free trade, economic prosperity?have developed a taken-for-granted quality. It is hard for average Americans to tally the myriad benefits they re? ceive from the country's position of authority, but it is relatively easy for them to see multilateral institutions constraining the country's freedom of action. Precisely because unipolarity makes coercion and unilateralism possible, and for some attractive, any constraints on US foreign policy may appear too high a price to bear. 49 But if the United States is to remain the leader of the free world and pos?
sibly beyond, it must make its authority safe for others. To sustain US author?
ity over the long term, it must be embedded in new, more constraining multilateral institutions. Americans trust their government only because of its internal checks and balances. Although there may be disagreements on exactly where the appropriate scope of government authority ends, nearly all Ameri? cans agree that limited government is the best form of government. This same principle extends abroad. If the United States is to exercise authority over other states, and enjoy its fruits, that authority must be checked and balanced as well. The height of hubris is not that the United States might govern the world, at least in part. This is a fact of international politics. Rather, hubris arises in the belief that the virtue of its people and leaders will restrain the United States sufficiently such that other peoples will voluntarily cede a meas? ure of their sovereignty to it.50 Politicians and peoples may occasionally be saintly, but it would be folly to rely on this quality at home or abroad. 
